



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/465
4 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ZIMBABWE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as the Representative of the Current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), I have the honour to transmit herewith a text of an OAU press release issued in Addis Ababa on 29 May 1998, regarding diplomatic efforts deployed by the OAU Secretary-General aimed at defusing the current tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Machivenyika Tobias MAPURANGA
Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe
Representative of the Current Chairman
of the OAU

ANNEX

Press release issued by the Organization of African Unity in
Addis Ababa on 29 May 1998

The Secretary-General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, paid a one-day working visit to Eritrea yesterday. The visit was undertaken within the framework of the ongoing efforts by African and non-African leaders to defuse tension and seek a peaceful resolution to the current dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Before proceeding to Asmara, the Secretary-General went to Djibouti where he had a meeting with President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who briefed him on the efforts he has deployed since the inception of the current crisis to help end the tension between the two countries, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

From Djibouti, the Secretary-General flew to Asmara for a meeting with President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. During their long and frank exchange of views, Dr. Salim expressed his serious concern, and that of the continent, over the current tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea and its implications for the peace, security and stability, not only of both countries, but also the Horn of Africa region and the entire African continent. He stressed the fact that the only viable option is for a peaceful resolution of the dispute, especially given the fact that military confrontation cannot and will neither resolve the fundamental dispute that gave rise to the current dispute in the first place, nor serve the long-term interest of the people of the two sisterly countries. He also expressed his support for the ongoing efforts being deployed by President Gouled of Djibouti, Vice-President Kagame of Rwanda and the Government of the United States of America.

On his part, President Isaias Afwerki briefed the Secretary-General on the position of his Government and Eritrea's preparedness to work towards a peaceful resolution of the dispute, if a framework mutually acceptable to the two sides could be established, through the current facilitation efforts by the friends of both countries.

Prior to his visit to Djibouti and Eritrea, the Secretary-General had met with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Ato Meles Zenawi, on two separate occasions. On all of those occasions, the Prime Minister consistently expressed his Government's disposition to resolve the current crisis peacefully, provided the fundamental and immediate cause of the recent tension is removed.

Even though there remain serious concerns over the situation, the Secretary-General has been encouraged by his meetings with the leaders of both Ethiopia and Eritrea, particularly, their expressed desire and disposition to seek a peaceful resolution of the present dispute between their two countries. The Secretary-General continues to call for vigilance and maximum restraint by the leadership of Ethiopia and Eritrea, given that a military confrontation will not serve the interest of the peoples of both countries, at a time when all

efforts should be directed at the improvement of the well-being of Ethiopians and Eritreans and the economic development of their two countries.

On the basis of the discussions he held with the leaders of the two countries, the Secretary-General is firmly convinced that a peaceful resolution of the dispute is not only desirable, but possible. The OAU will continue to work towards the attainment of that objective.



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5 June 1998

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, 1156 (1998) of 16 March 1998 and 1162 (1998) of 17 April 1998 and the statements of its President of 26 February 1998 (S/PRST/1998/5) and 20 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/13),

Welcoming the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peaceful and secure conditions in the country, to re-establish effective administration and the democratic process, and to promote national reconciliation,

Deploing the continued resistance to the authority of the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone and stressing the urgency for all rebels to put an end to the atrocities, cease their resistance and lay down their arms,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to terminate the remaining prohibitions imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1132 (1997);

2. Further decides, with a view to prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone, that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, to Sierra Leone other than to the Government of Sierra Leone through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that Government to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify all Member States of the United Nations of the list;

3. Decides also that the restrictions referred to in paragraph 2 above shall not apply to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel for the sole use in Sierra Leone of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) or the United Nations;



4. Further decides that States shall notify all exports from their territories of arms or related matériel to Sierra Leone to the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), that the Government of Sierra Leone shall mark, register and notify to the Committee all imports made by it of arms and related matériel, and that the Committee shall report regularly to the Council on notifications so received;

5. Decides that all States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), as designated by the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), provided that the entry into or transit through a particular State of any such person may be authorized by the same Committee, and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry to its territory to its own nationals;

6. Decides that the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) shall continue to undertake the tasks referred to in paragraph 10 (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (h) of that resolution in relation to paragraphs 2 and 5 above;

7. Expresses its readiness to terminate the measures referred to in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 above once the control of the Government of Sierra Leone has been fully re-established over all its territory, and when all non-governmental forces have been disarmed and demobilized;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 3 months of the date of adoption of this resolution, and again within 6 months, regarding, in particular, the export of arms and related matériel referred to in paragraph 2 above, and on progress made towards the objectives referred to in paragraph 7 above;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



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LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to you on 3 June 1998, and its annex, the press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea (S/1998/459), I have the honour to transmit herewith a press statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia issued on 3 June 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



ANNEX

Press statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Ethiopia on 3 June 1998

The international community is well aware of the crisis that has developed between Ethiopia and Eritrea since the Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia on 12 May 1998, as a result of which Eritrea still occupies the Ethiopian locality of Badme and part of Shiraro. This aggression carried out by Eritrea with tanks and heavy weapons is now public knowledge and has been widely reported by the international media, including eyewitness reporters. Despite some prevarication, Eritrea would hardly deny this.

What Ethiopia has done in response to this unprovoked aggression is to denounce the aggression and call upon Eritrea to withdraw from Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia's preference is for the crisis to be settled peacefully, in a civilized manner and legally. Ethiopia is for legality and for civility and not for war.

This is why Ethiopia has continued to cooperate to the maximum level possible with the facilitators.

But even while the efforts of the facilitators has been under way, Eritrea has refused to desist from its provocative activities and from further attempts to create other facts on the ground. This explains the yet another attempt by Eritrea to take over additional Ethiopian localities in the past few days, specifically the localities of Aiga and Aliteina. It did not succeed. This latest aggression by Eritrea has also been widely reported by the international media. But Ethiopia was not diverted by this from allowing the efforts of the facilitators to continue and thus has desisted from aggravating the situation. In fact, what Ethiopia did was to ask members of the international media to leave the vicinity so that the work of the facilitators may not face undue complications.

But the Eritrean Government appears to have been set at continuing with the pattern demonstrated on 12 May 1998, because, convinced that there could not be eyewitness accounts of their aggression, they again decided to launch another attack this morning (the morning of 3 June) in the vicinity of Zala Ambesa, Aiga and Aliteina, an effort which, as usual, was designed to create facts on the ground, and which failed.

Because this latest aggression by Eritrea could not be confirmed by the international media, Eritrea thought it could get away with shifting the blame onto Ethiopia, thus the press release today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea, accusing Ethiopia of aggression.

It is the position of the Ethiopian Government that Eritrea would benefit little by trying to hoodwink the international community. It would benefit little from trying to create additional facts on the ground. Its military aggression should stop and it should allow the facilitators to make a difference

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for peace. This is Ethiopia's preference, as it has been since the first aggression was carried out by Eritrea on 12 May 1998.

Eritrea's attempt to create additional facts on the ground and, when this fails, to try to make Ethiopia appear as an aggressor like Eritrea, is increasingly becoming a new strategy of the Eritrean authorities. This is the whole essence of the press release by the Eritrean Foreign Ministry referred to above.

It would be rather odd for Ethiopia, which has refused to respond in kind to the Eritrean aggression of 12 May and which continues to do the maximum possible to assist the facilitators, to now engage in activities that would harm this effort.

Eritrea should do likewise: help the facilitators as Ethiopia does, so that their efforts, conducted under difficult circumstances, can succeed, and so that this crisis can be solved peacefully. This is the preference of Ethiopia. It should be that of Eritrea as well. Eritrea's cooperation with the facilitators is the only way to ensure the peaceful resolution of the crisis.



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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda items 64 and 81
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY


SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative
of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, dated 1 June 1998, in connection with the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter together with the annexed statement issued as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Alyaksandr SYCHOU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



ANNEX

[Original: Russian]

Statement of 1 June 1998 by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Belarus

Belarus received the news of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan with alarm and concern. The series of nuclear tests that were conducted pushed the world, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons, constitute a new round of the nuclear arms race and create considerable additional difficulties in the way of the further reduction of nuclear weapons. These actions contradict the consistent efforts of the world community to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime at the global and regional levels as an important factor in international stability and security.

Belarus, which a few years ago made the historic choice to renounce the nuclear potential it possessed and is a party to a number of the most important agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, cannot but feel a special sense of responsibility in this respect and be alarmed by this turn of events.

Belarus calls on all countries that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and possess military nuclear programmes to review their current nuclear policy, accede to that Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and promote the development of treaties to prohibit the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in all of which mankind places its hopes for a nuclear-free world in the twenty-first century.

The events of recent days have heightened our alarm at the possibility of a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation not only in the south Asia region, but also beyond its limits. The absence of legal obligations on the international community creates fertile soil for such a development. As is known, on the basis of its consistent anti-nuclear policy and of the threats to the fate of future generations, of the European continent and of the world as a whole, Belarus has called and calls on all countries, in the light of present-day realities, to support the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free area in central and eastern Europe. Belarus is convinced that the implementation of this idea will strengthen security and confidence in Europe, contribute to the geographical non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and constitute an important step towards the further strengthening of peace and stability in Europe and throughout the world.

We believe that all non-nuclear-weapon States could assume agreed responsibilities to renounce once and for all the deployment of nuclear weapons in their territory. Belarus calls on the nuclear Powers to assume obligations not under any circumstances to deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States.



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
S/1998/469
4 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1998 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990)
CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 1143 (1997). The report, covering the Committee's activities in relation to the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) during the second half of phase III after the entry into force of paragraph 1 of resolution 1143 (1997), was adopted by the Committee on 4 June 1998.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait



Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation
between Iraq and Kuwait on the implementation of
the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10
of resolution 986 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1143 (1997) of 4 December 1997, by which the Committee was requested, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, to report to the Council prior to the end of the 180-day period on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995). The report covers the Committee's activities with regard to the implementation of those paragraphs of resolution 986 (1995) during the second 90-day period of phase III, which ends on 2 June 1998, after the entry into force of paragraph 1 of resolution 1143 (1997).

2. The Committee has to date submitted seven reports to the Security Council on the oil-for-food programme, five reports (S/1997/213, S/1997/417, S/1997/692, S/1997/942 and S/1998/187) on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995) and two reports (S/1998/92 and S/1998/336) on the refining and clarifying of the Committee's working procedures in order to expedite the approval process for sending humanitarian supplies to Iraq.

II. SALE OF PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

3. Since the resumption of petroleum sales from Iraq, the export of petroleum from Iraq during phase III has proceeded well, with excellent cooperation among the oil overseers, the independent inspection agents (Saybolt), the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and the national oil purchasers. In view of the delayed resumption in petroleum sales and a serious price drop, the projected \$400 million revenue shortfall in the first 90-day revenue objective of \$1.07 billion (including the pipeline fee) and its potential impact on humanitarian supplies to Iraq, the Security Council decided in its resolution 1158 (1998) of 25 March 1998 to permit the import of petroleum originating in Iraq, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of \$1.4 billion within the second 90-day period of phase III, beginning on 5 March 1998.

4. Fifty-three contracts, involving purchasers from 18 countries, have been reviewed by the overseers in phase III. Fifty-two contracts were approved and one contract was cancelled by the State Oil Marketing Organization because of the inability of the purchaser to present all supporting documents. The total quantity of oil approved for export under those contracts corresponds to approximately 184.1 million barrels for the 180 days, the highest amount under the oil-for-food programme. All contracts submitted employed the pricing mechanisms approved by the Committee on the recommendation of the overseers.

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5. Following the first 90-day period, during which 48 liftings, totalling 53.6 million barrels for a value of \$645 million were completed, 102 liftings totalling 114.1 million barrels with an estimated value of \$1,300 million was completed in the second 90-day period. Sixteen liftings remain for the second quarter (as at 26 May 1998). Letters of credit opened for each of the liftings were reviewed and confirmed by the overseers upon compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts approved and consultations with the parties concerned. About 55 per cent of the liftings were made at Ceyhan in Turkey. The largest share of the volume lifted was sold under the pricing formula for the European market. At current prices total revenue for the whole of phase III is estimated at about \$2.14 billion (including the pipeline fees).

6. The overseers have continued to advise the Committee on the pricing mechanisms, contract approval and modifications, management of the 90-day revenue objective of \$1.07 billion (including the pipeline fees) and other pertinent questions related to export and monitoring, under Security Council resolutions 986 (1995), 1143 (1997) and 1158 (1998).

7. The overseers and the independent inspection agents (Saybolt) deployed to monitor oil loadings and transfers have worked closely to ensure the effective monitoring of the relevant oil installations as well as the liftings, with full cooperation from the Iraqi authorities. In March 1998, the overseers accompanied the group of experts established pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1153 (1998) on a visit to Iraq to determine, in consultation with the Government of Iraq, the capacity of Iraq to export petroleum and petroleum products sufficient to produce the income referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1153 (1998).

8. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the procedures of the Committee (S/1996/636), 268 national oil purchasers, nominated from 45 countries, are authorized to communicate directly with the overseers.

9. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of the procedures of the Committee, the overseers have continued to report to the Committee on a weekly basis on the contracts considered by them relating to the sale of petroleum originating in Iraq, including the cumulative quantity and approximate value of petroleum authorized for export. So far, 74 such reports have been submitted to the Committee.

III. EXPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ

10. During the second 90-day reporting period in phase III the Committee has continued to attach high priority to the work of processing contracts for supplying humanitarian goods to Iraq. By 9 March 1998, the oil revenues available for the purchase of humanitarian supplies under phases I and II had been exhausted. Under these circumstances, the Government of Iraq had requested that all medical applications still pending under phases I or II be transferred to phase III, while contracts involving non-health-sector goods could be renegotiated and resubmitted under phase III or subsequent phases. The Secretariat returned the latter category of applications to the missions concerned with advice on how to resubmit them, should the parties so choose.

11. As at 1 June, the committee had received 578 applications under phase III for exports of humanitarian supplies to Iraq. Of the total, 11 were subsequently cancelled, 529 circulated to Committee members for action and 38 were still being processed. Of those sent to the Committee for consideration, 468 were found eligible for payment from the United Nations Iraq Account, totalling approximately \$1.04 billion, 17 were placed on hold and 44 were pending under "no-objection" procedure. In respect of the 468 applications which were found eligible for payment from the Iraq Account, 151 letters of approval were released on the basis of availability of funds and the remaining 317 were still waiting for sufficient funds to become available in the Iraq Account.

12. The confirmation of the arrival of goods by the United Nations independent inspection agents (Lloyd's Register) has been going on smoothly at the four entry points into Iraq, at Al-Walid, Trebil, Zakho and Umm Qasr. The Iraqi authorities have accorded the independent agents full cooperation in their work. By the end of May 1998, 1,095 consignments of humanitarian supplies have been confirmed as having arrived in Iraq in total or in partial shipments.

IV. EFFORTS BY THE COMMITTEE TO EXPEDITE DELIVERIES OF HUMANITARIAN GOODS TO IRAQ

13. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1153 (1998), the Committee submitted on 17 April a report (S/1998/336) containing a number of measures it had taken to implement the decisions contained in its report of 30 January (S/1998/92) with regard to the refining and clarifying of its working procedures. Taking into account the relevant observations and recommendations set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 1 February (S/1998/90), the Committee reviewed its work in this area and, as a follow-up to its report of 30 January, formulated a number of steps with a view to enhancing its efficiency in expediting the approving process of contracts. One of them is the adoption of the guidelines and points of understanding on simplified procedure to approve applications for foodstuffs, by which the Committee conferred on the Secretariat the authority to determine whether applications for foodstuffs were in order under those guidelines and points of understanding and to submit them for approval to the Chairman of the Committee in accordance with the conditions set out in the guidelines and points of understanding (S/1998/336, appendix). Those guidelines and points of understanding will come into effect on the day on which the Secretary-General reports to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1153 (1998). Regarding contracts concerning medicines, the Committee will continue its work in this respect. With regard to the issue of reimbursement of the 53 per cent account from the 13 per cent account for joint purchases, the Committee expects to receive soon, for its consideration, the report referred to in paragraph 4 (d) (iv) of its report of 30 January (S/1998/92).

14. In order to expedite the approval process of humanitarian contracts under resolution 986 (1995), all States engaged in the export of humanitarian goods to Iraq were encouraged by a press release dated 2 April 1998 to present applications to the Committee as soon as contracts were concluded, and the attention of their exporters was drawn to the reminder in the approval letters

with a view to ensuring the timely delivery of humanitarian supplies to Iraq by the required delivery date as indicated in the contracts.

V. MATTERS RELATING TO THE KIRKUK-YUMURTALIK PIPELINE AND SHIPMENTS OF SPARE PARTS AND EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

15. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 986 (1995), Turkey on 18 March 1998 requested the Committee's approval for payments of the oil transportation fee due to Turkey during the first 90-day period of Iraq's oil exportation under resolution 1143 (1997). A transfer of the agreed pipeline fee to a total amount of \$48,285,616.44 was effected on 15 May 1998 with Turkey as the beneficiary.

16. On 6 March 1998, at its 170th meeting, the Committee heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the Iraq Programme on the practical monitoring arrangements concerning shipments of spare parts and equipment from Turkey to Iraq to ensure the medium-term and long-term safety of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. On 5 December 1997 and 25 February 1998, two applications by Germany were submitted to the Committee concerning the supply of spare parts and equipment to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. On 18 May 1998, the Executive Director of the Iraq Programme informed the Chairman of the Committee that the monitoring arrangements were in place and operational. Consequently, the Committee has been able to approve several applications by Turkey, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to ship a total of \$24 million worth of spare parts and equipment for the repair and maintenance of the pipeline.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

17. The Committee will make continuous efforts for the effective implementation of all relevant arrangements under the oil-for-food programme; in particular, it will deal with those suggestions contained in its report dated 17 April 1998 (S/1998/336) which may further contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the approval process for humanitarian supplies to Iraq.



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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PREPARED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1160 (1998) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998. It covers the period since my last report, dated 30 April 1998 (S/1998/361).

2. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council adopted resolution 1160 (1998) by which, inter alia, it decided that all States should prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, of arms and related matériel of all types and spare parts for them, and prevent arming and training for terrorist activities there.

II. SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1160 (1998)

3. At its second meeting, on 6 May 1998, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998) adopted the guidelines for the conduct of its work to assist it in discharging its mandate pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1160 (1998). The text of the guidelines was transmitted to all States and appropriate international organizations.

4. On 7 May 1998, Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim (Brazil), Chairman of the Committee, issued an appeal on behalf of the members of the Committee to all States and international and regional organizations to provide information regarding violations or suspected violations of the prohibitions imposed by the Security Council in resolution 1160 (1998).

5. As at 29 May 1998, the following 34 States had reported pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1160 (1998) to the Committee on the steps they had taken to give effect to the prohibitions imposed by the resolution: Armenia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic



of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay.

III. COMPREHENSIVE REGIME TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PROHIBITIONS IMPOSED BY RESOLUTION 1160 (1998)

6. In my first report (S/1998/361) dated 30 April 1998, I outlined in general terms the concept of the comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998). Following the informal consultations of the Security Council held on 8 May 1998 to consider the report, I was informed by the President of the Security Council of the Council's wish that in exploring the establishment of a comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998), I should take into account the existing capacities and potentials, in particular of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Accordingly, on 15 May, I addressed a letter to Mr. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, in which I invited him to provide me, at his earliest convenience, with the views of OSCE on how to establish the comprehensive monitoring regime. I stated that, in doing so, OSCE could benefit from advice and support from other regional organizations which might be in a position to contribute to the success of the monitoring regime. The full text of the letter is contained in annex I to the present report.

7. In a letter dated 1 June 1998, the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE conveyed the views of his Organization on the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring regime. He confirmed the readiness of OSCE to contribute to the monitoring of the arms embargo within its capabilities. He stated that the particular comparative advantage of OSCE was its ongoing presence in the region through its missions deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He stated further that the monitoring activities, carried out currently by OSCE, along the border between Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, can usefully contribute to an overall arms embargo monitoring effort, under the overall responsibility of the United Nations. He added that the border monitoring capabilities of the OSCE presence in Albania were being strengthened. He concluded that, while not being able to assume a leading coordinating role with regard to an arms embargo monitoring effort undertaken by other regional organizations, OSCE might offer a flexible coordinating framework for monitoring activities in the field if so desired by participants in the effort. The full text of the letter is attached to the present report as annex II.

8. In the light of the response from OSCE and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), I have written to the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the Presidency of the European Union, the Secretary-General of the Western European Union and the Executive Director of the Danube Commission with a view to exploring their readiness to participate in the comprehensive regime, and to submit to me, on the basis of information that may be available to them, reports on suspected violations of the prohibitions imposed by the resolution,

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for consideration by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998).

9. Upon receipt of the views of the above-mentioned organizations, I shall submit my recommendation to the Security Council for a comprehensive monitoring regime, taking into account the existing potential within the United Nations and the views expressed by those organizations.

10. In accordance with the request of the President of the Security Council, I am looking into the possibility of utilizing the existing potential within the United Nations for the purposes of establishing a comprehensive monitoring regime. I have, in my latest report on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (S/1998/454 of 1 June 1998), concluded that it would seem to be premature to proceed with a decision to withdraw UNPREDEP after 31 August 1998. I have suggested that the Council may wish to consider extending the mandate of UNPREDEP for an additional six months, until 28 February 1999, on the understanding that the Council could review its decision, should the ongoing discussions at the international level on the possible need for an expanded military presence in the region and on the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring regime result in decisions which would affect UNPREDEP's role and responsibilities. Meanwhile, UNPREDEP will, in accordance with its mandate, continue to monitor and report on developments along the border with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, within its current strength, UNPREDEP will not be able to sustain intensive monitoring and reporting on activities at the borders. Consequently, it would be my intention, should the Council so wish, to submit before 15 July specific proposals on a possible strengthening of the Force's overall capacity, taking into consideration the situation in the region and the relevant Security Council resolutions, including 795 (1992) and 1160 (1998).

IV. SITUATION IN KOSOVO

11. The Security Council, in resolution 1160 (1998), requested me to keep it regularly informed on the situation in Kosovo and to provide an assessment on whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had complied in a constructive manner with conditions put forward by the Contact Group. As the Council is aware, the situation in Kosovo is evolving daily. This report describes the situation up to the time of writing.

12. As I indicated in my first report, the United Nations Secretariat has no political presence in Kosovo. Consequently, this part of my report draws primarily on information received from a variety of non-United Nations sources, including the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE and the United States of America, as a member of the Contact Group, in response to requests from the Secretariat for information. Where indicated, it also includes specific data obtained from other sources, such as NATO. The information collected is summarized below in the remainder of section IV.

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Security situation

13. Since my last report to the Security Council, the situation in Kosovo has continued to remain tense and security conditions have been steadily deteriorating. Almost daily violent clashes have occurred along the borders with Albania and in other parts of Kosovo. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assert that a total of 356 terrorist assaults were perpetrated between 1 January and 27 May 1998 in Kosovo; and that the main targets were police officers, police premises and civilians, both ethnic Serbs and Albanians. The highest number of incidents was reported in the Glodovac, Decani, Srbica, Djakovica and Klina areas.

14. The Serbian special police maintain a strong presence in Kosovo. They have consolidated their positions and reinforced checkpoints, particularly in Drenica. Police heavy equipment is still in place. Special police units have been responsible for armed action against civilians, although they also have suffered casualties as a result of attacks by armed Kosovo Albanians. The Government of Serbia recently announced that it was undertaking what it termed more effective measures against terrorism in Kosovo, which entails the deployment of forces from urban barracks to field camps to restrict the manoeuvrability of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and to counter the increased sophistication of KLA weaponry. The Government reportedly does not plan to reduce its police force in Kosovo.

15. The activities of the Yugoslav Army, which maintains a large presence in Kosovo, have centred on securing the borders. Fighting continues between the Government forces and armed Kosovo Albanians in several areas, including Drenica and the Ponosevac region, near the border with Albania.

16. The upsurge in violence since mid-May has been characterized by an increase in civilian casualties and the use of heavy weapons against non-combatants. Security incidents have spread beyond Srbica and Glodovac to Klina in the Drenica region, and to the west and south into Decani and Djakovica municipalities, bordering Albania. Fighting between Serbian police and Kosovo Albanians, and KLA attacks on the Pristina-pec road, caused the Serbian authorities to close this main east-west highway for several days beginning on 11 May. This reportedly led to severe food shortages in the western part of Kosovo. During recent police operations in Klina, Ponosevac and Decani municipalities, a number of casualties on both sides were reported. According to Government sources, the clashes were provoked by the KLA attacks. Several villages were reportedly razed or burned, and there are reports that police summarily executed a number of ethnic Albanians. Total casualties in the Kosovo crisis are estimated at approximately 200 since fighting broke out there last February.

17. The Kosovo Liberation Army has increased its attacks in recent weeks, and has shown an increased propensity and ability to attack government security forces. It has issued threats against police and military, as well as against Kosovo Albanians who allegedly cooperate with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Killing and abductions of civilians and police personnel are reportedly continuing on a daily basis in different parts of

Kosovo. There are also reports of attacks directed against civilian population centres.

18. Various sources report that both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have been maltreated, harassed and beaten by police and/or unknown perpetrators at various locations. Security incidents have reportedly affected not only ethnic Albanians and Serbs, but also Montenegrins, Roma and Muslims. In a troubling new development, there have been reports of a rise in the number of incidents involving civilians attacking other civilians for ethnically motivated reasons.

19. The increased number of acts of violence on both sides and the heavy presence of the Serbian police, including special police units, as well as military forces, have been generating insecurity among the local population. According to some estimates, the number of internally displaced persons, including Kosovo Albanians and ethnic Serbs, exceeded 42,000 by the end of May.

20. The intensity of the conflict significantly increased in recent days as a result of a major Serbian police offensive operation in the south-western part of Kosovo, adjacent to the Albanian border. The most recent reports indicate extremely heavy fighting between the Serbian police and armed groups, believed to be KLA, resulting in the loss of dozens of lives. Some observers indicate that the Serbian forces used heavy weaponry, including mortars and possibly artillery. There are also reports that several villages in the area and a number of houses in the town of Decani have been burnt and destroyed. It was not possible to verify these reports as access to the area has been restricted. This new wave of violence in Kosovo caused, for the first time, a significant flow of refugees to Albania. As at 4 June, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered some 6,500 refugees and the number was gradually increasing. Therefore, UNHCR has increased its planning figures to 20,000.

21. The latest fighting represents a worrying trend. There is strong apprehension that with the further escalation of hostilities the situation may get out of control and draw neighbouring States into the conflict.

22. Tension has increased along the border with Albania. Both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania have reported a number of incidents at the border, ranging from illegal border crossings to violations of airspace.

23. No evidence was found of large-scale arms trafficking across the border between Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, involving the transfer of heavy weapons or bulk transfers of small arms. The arms trafficking which is occurring appears to be primarily smaller-scale transfers across that border. Because of the topography of the region, the porous border and the limited monitoring, estimates of total amounts are difficult. The Government of Albania reportedly has set up checkpoints on roads leading to the border to prevent vehicles transporting weapons from reaching the border area. Albanian authorities have acknowledged difficulty in controlling the border with Kosovo, and that checkpoints could serve to prevent weapons from reaching the area of conflict.

24. In support of efforts aimed at preventing the spread of the current conflict beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OSCE has developed its border-monitoring capacities in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Proposals to increase the number of monitors are being considered. In Albania, temporary field offices are now established in Bajram Curri and Kukes. The OSCE mission in Albania (19 personnel) cooperates closely with local authorities, the European Community Monitor Mission (22 personnel), UNHCR, the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, and also with UNPREDEP.

25. The situation along the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is calm and relatively normal. There does not appear to be significant arms trafficking across that border. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has redeployed troops and stepped up patrols along its border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNPREDEP conducts daily patrols along the border and reports on incidents it observes, including smuggling. UNPREDEP has not reported any incidents of arms smuggling since the adoption of resolution 1160 (1998).

26. On 2 June, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana informed me about the discussion of the situation in Kosovo by the NATO Foreign Minister at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 28 May in Luxembourg. The Foreign Ministers strongly supported the continuation of an international military presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after the end of the current mandate of UNPREDEP. They also supported the continuation of the mandate of UNPREDEP that contributed significantly to the stability in the region. Mr. Solana told me that NATO has two major objectives with respect to the situation in Kosovo: first, to help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of the international community; and secondly, to promote stability and security in neighbouring countries, with particular emphasis on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. To that end, the Foreign Ministers decided to enhance and supplement NATO's Partnership for Peace activities in both Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, so as to promote security and stability in these Partner countries and to signal NATO's interest in containing the crisis and in seeking a peaceful resolution.

27. In addition, so as to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm NATO's willingness to take further steps if necessary, the Foreign Ministers have commissioned military advice on support for United Nations and OSCE monitoring activity, as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on a relevant legal basis, in order to help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis and to strengthen security and stability in the region.

Access to Kosovo

28. Foreign diplomats and journalists have encountered some restrictions in their visits to Kosovo. In some cases the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia said diplomats could not enter as roads were impassable because of fighting. Following the Serbian police offensive of 22 May, monitors of the European Community Monitor Mission were reportedly harassed and prevented from reaching the areas under siege.

29. There are concerns regarding deterioration of the humanitarian situation. The ability of humanitarian non-governmental organizations to provide relief to internally displaced persons in Kosovo has reportedly been hampered by incidents of harassment by Serbian police and by blocked access to areas with large humanitarian needs. Various sources reported that, beginning on 15 May, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia impeded food deliveries into Kosovo by blocking the passage of trucks carrying commercial shipments of food and supplies arriving by road. Some 200 trucks were reportedly turned back between 15 and 17 May. The Federal Republic authorities denied that a ban was in place, and stated that certain shipments had been denied entry because of incomplete or false documentation. Meanwhile, UNHCR goods from Belgrade were delivered as usual.

30. Information on the blockade caused panic among the local population, which emptied the local stores to stock up on essential foodstuffs. Almost immediately, shortages of staple foodstuffs began to appear in Kosovo. These shortages were alleviated on 21 May, when Federal Republic authorities lifted the blockade, allowing some 80 trucks into Kosovo.

31. Reacting to these worrying reports, the NATO Foreign Ministers on 28 May 1998 expressed particular concern "that the recent resurgence of violence has been accompanied by the creation of obstacles denying access by international observers and humanitarian organizations to the affected areas in Kosovo".

Dialogue between the parties concerned

32. Following intensive diplomatic efforts by European regional organizations and individual States, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and United States Special Representative Robert S. Gelbard were able to overcome obstacles on both sides to gain agreement for the start of substantive dialogue without preconditions on Kosovo. The dialogue began in Belgrade on 15 May, with a meeting between President Slobodan Milosevic and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, along with their respective teams. The two sides discussed the modalities of the follow-up negotiations process.

33. The Heads of State of the group of eight industrialized countries, meeting at Birmingham on 16 May, noted in their statement on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo that the 15 May meeting was a "positive first step". The leaders urged both sides "to ensure that the dialogue now begun leads rapidly to the adoption of concrete measures to lower tensions and stop violence". The group of eight further noted that "it is particularly important that President Milosevic has assumed personal responsibility in the search for a resolution of the problems of Kosovo, including its future status".

34. At the meeting held on 22 May in Pristina, groups of six experts from each side discussed the framework for future talks and confidence-building measures. The initial meetings were an important first step in the dialogue process. The distance between the two parties remains great, however, and it will be important to reinforce that process. The United States has informed me that it will continue to play an active role in the negotiating process and that Special Representative Gelbard and Ambassador Holbrooke have agreed to facilitate the dialogue if called upon by the parties to do so.

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35. The NATO Foreign Ministers, in their statement of 28 May 1998, expressed their conviction that the problems of Kosovo can best be resolved through a process of open and unconditional dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. They acknowledged that the status quo is unsustainable and supported a political solution which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserving the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and safeguarding the human and civil rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, whatever their ethnic origin.

36. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, has continued to reject the engagement of outside representatives in the dialogue. The referendum held in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 23 April created a hurdle to direct third-party participation. I discussed this matter and the current situation in Kosovo during my meeting with Mr. Felipe González on 1 June 1998.

Measures taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

37. The situation in Kosovo has been the subject of discussion at the weekly meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council and the Watch Group focusing on developments in Kosovo. Furthermore, OSCE has been closely following developments in Kosovo through monitoring visits conducted by diplomatic personnel of OSCE participating States accredited to Belgrade.

38. The OSCE Troika prepared a "report on compliance" with the requirements to be met by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, forwarded to the Group's meeting in Rome on 29 April. The report noted, inter alia, no positive development on such central issues as the opening of unconditional dialogue, cessation of violence and the acceptance of the mission of Mr. González.

39. In a letter to President Milosevic, dated 4 May, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office noted that the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating rather than improving and urged the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to accept the mission of Mr. González. A reply dated 7 May from Foreign Minister Jovanovic reiterated that the mission would be welcome only to discuss the relationship between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and OSCE, and the possible return of the OSCE missions of long duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina would not be considered before the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in OSCE was restored. The Chairman-in-Office, replying to Mr. Jovanovic on 8 May, insisted on the importance of launching the mission of Mr. González to talk on all issues dealing with relations between OSCE and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

40. In a statement issued on 13 May, the Chairman-in-Office welcomed the announced meeting between President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova and characterized it as an important first step and an opportunity for the two sides to agree on a format for dialogue. The Chairman-in-Office reiterated that an international representative would greatly facilitate such talks.

41. A representative of the Chairman-in-Office participated in an informal meeting of the Contact Group organized on the margins of the meeting of the group of eight at Birmingham on 16 May. On the previous day, the group of eight leaders in their final communiqué underlined the importance of cooperation with

the González mission. They expressed their readiness to promote a clear and achievable path towards the full integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the international community. At the same time the statement warned that "if Belgrade fails to build on recent progress and a genuine political process does not get under way, its isolation will deepen".

42. The NATO Foreign Ministers on 28 May also called upon President Milosevic "to agree to the readmission of the OSCE long-term mission, and to accept the mission of Mr. Felipe González, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Special Representative of the European Union".

43. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe remains ready to assist in the process aimed at peaceful solution of the conflict in Kosovo and maintains its expectation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will accept the mission of Mr. González as OSCE and European Union representative, as well as three missions of long duration, including that in Pristina.

Implementation of the Kosovo education agreement

44. There has been progress in the implementation of the agreement signed by Serbian and Kosovo Albanian members of the "3 plus 3" commission on 23 March. In compliance with the agreement, the Institute of Albanology opened in Pristina on 31 March. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia turned over three faculties of the University of Pristina to the Kosovo Albanians on 15 May. Ethnic Serb protesters attempted to block the transfer, and government forces intervened to evict the protesters after they damaged the facilities.

V. OBSERVATIONS

45. I have welcomed the beginning of a political dialogue as an important step forward in the search for a just and lasting solution of the problems in Kosovo. Convinced that a non-violent approach is the way to reach a mutually accepted settlement in Kosovo, I strongly support the efforts of those committed to peaceful means. In this regard, I urge the parties concerned to continue the negotiations started in Pristina on 22 May with the aim of lowering tensions, stopping the spread of violence and opening the way for peaceful resolution of the crisis.

46. However, the situation in Kosovo continues to be extremely volatile and shows marked signs of deterioration. The armed confrontation in Kosovo has led to loss of life and there is a serious risk of a humanitarian and refugee crisis in the area. In this regard, the most recent Serbian police offensive in Kosovo is particular cause for alarm. I am gravely concerned that the mounting violence in Kosovo might overwhelm political efforts to prevent further escalation of the crisis. I deplore the excessive use of force by the Serbian police in Kosovo and call upon all parties concerned to demonstrate restraint and commit themselves to a peaceful solution. The use of violence to suppress political dissent or in pursuit of political goals is inadmissible. Terrorist activities from whatever quarter contribute to the deadly spiral of violence that jeopardizes stability in the region.

47. During a meeting with Dr. Rugova on 2 June 1998, I welcomed his non-violent approach and encouraged him to continue the search for a peaceful and mutually acceptable settlement short of independence. I reiterated that the current situation in Kosovo is unacceptable and assured Dr. Rugova that he may count on international support in his quest for such a solution.

48. I commend efforts by regional and other organizations, coalitions of States and individual Governments aimed at achieving a political solution in Kosovo. I invite all parties to cooperate fully with them. I am ready to support the efforts of the international community to resolve the Kosovo crisis with the means at my disposal.

ANNEX I

Letter dated 15 May from the Secretary-General addressed
to the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, by operative paragraph 15 of which the Council requested me "in consultation with appropriate regional organizations to include in my first report recommendations for the establishment of a comprehensive regime to monitor implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, and calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to extend full cooperation in this regard". As you may be aware, the Council decided by the above resolution that "all States should, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and should prevent arming and training for terrorist activities there".

In my report to the Security Council dated 30 April 1998 (S/1998/361), I expressed the belief that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with contributions and assistance from other organizations, as necessary, would be in a position to carry out the requested monitoring functions effectively. In this connection, I was referring to the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union and the Danube Commission, bearing in mind their contribution to the success of the sanctions regime in the case of the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb party.

Following the informal consultations of the Security Council held on 8 May 1998 to consider my first report, the President of the Council informed me of the Council's wish that, in exploring the establishment of a comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), I should take into account the existing capacities and potentials, in particular of the United Nations and OSCE.

I would be grateful, in particular, if in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, you could provide me, at your earliest convenience, with the views of your Organization for the establishment of the comprehensive monitoring regime. In doing so, you may wish to seek advice and support from other regional organizations which may be in a position to contribute to the success of the monitoring regime. In the meantime, I am looking into the possibility of utilizing existing potential within the United Nations, in accordance with the request of the President of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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ANNEX II

Letter dated 1 June 1998 from the Chairman-in-Office of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
addressed to the Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 15 May 1998, requesting my views - in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - in regard to a possible OSCE role in enforcing the United Nations Arms Embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998.

I would begin by noting that OSCE stands ready to contribute to the monitoring of an arms embargo within its capabilities. This has been confirmed in the course of consultations carried out among the representatives of the OSCE member States in Vienna.

In my view, resolution 1160 (1998) places primary responsibility for enforcing the arms embargo on States. This burden falls particularly on neighbouring States and those with existing arms supplier relationships with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Within that scope, OSCE is prepared to contribute to the monitoring of an arms embargo under the overall responsibility of the United Nations. Unfortunately, OSCE has rather limited capabilities and does not have the required resources for the establishment of a comprehensive arms embargo-monitoring regime. It is my understanding of the mentioned resolution 1160 (1998) that any enforcement mechanism must relate to the entire border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and not simply to borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, where OSCE has a presence. This would require comprehensive monitoring of all border crossings, airports, sea- and riverports. Indeed, OSCE experience in enforcing the previous arms embargo indicates that the majority of large-scale arms shipments to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have entered by air or sea, rather than overland. Since OSCE does not have missions in Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities are unlikely to welcome OSCE monitors to carry out this function within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprehensive enforcement of resolution 1160 (1998) appears to be out of the reach of our Organization.

Executing a less-than-comprehensive enforcement effort would be in my view problematic. Comprehensive border monitoring in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia alone would be extremely resource-intensive, and would result in the unequal application of the embargo. Clearly, the intent of the resolution was not to place a selective arms embargo on Kosovo alone.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can, however, play a useful part in such a regime. This Organization's particular comparative advantage is its presence on the ground in the region, through the missions deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Monitoring activities along the borders between Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia carried out currently by OSCE, can usefully contribute to an overall arms embargo monitoring effort, under the mentioned overall United Nations responsibility, as a possible early warning indicator. I would note that the border-monitoring capabilities of the OSCE presence in Albania are undergoing a process of strengthening.

The OSCE presence in Albania provides important early warning of large-scale movements of people and weapons, and balanced reporting from the border area. It also serves as a visible symbol of the international community's abiding interest in promoting a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

The OSCE is ready to share the relevant information available as a result of its current monitoring activities with the United Nations, including its bodies responsible for arms embargo monitoring.

In conclusion, I would summarize my reaction to your request by saying that, while not able to assume a leading coordinating role with regard to an arms embargo monitoring effort undertaken by other regional organizations, OSCE may offer a flexible coordinating framework for monitoring activities in the field if so desired by the participants in the effort.

(Signed) Bronislaw GEREMEK



Security Council

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8 June 1998

ENGLISH AND SPANISH ONLY

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PREPARED PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTION 1160 (1998) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Corrigendum

Paragraph 4

The paragraph should read

4. On 7 May 1998, Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim (Brazil), Chairman of the Committee, issued an appeal on behalf of the members of the Committee to all States and international and regional organizations to provide information regarding violations or suspected violations of the prohibitions imposed by the Security Council in resolution 1160 (1998).



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5 June 1998

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LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a statement by His Excellency Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, on the aggression carried out by the State of Eritrea on Ethiopia to the sixty-eighth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Intervention by H.E. Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the aggression carried out by the State of Eritrea on Ethiopia to the sixty-eighth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity

I wanted to take the floor because I felt it necessary to brief my colleagues and the Council of Ministers on the very sad recent development in the relations between Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea - a crisis which began with the aggression carried out by the Eritrean authorities against Ethiopia.

Before I proceed further, however, I feel it is my obligation to express my Government's appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and to all those who have tried, under very difficult circumstances, to make their good offices available to ensure the peaceful resolution of the crisis by trying to put some sense into the minds of the Eritrean leadership to withdraw from two localities in north-west Ethiopia, namely Badme and part of Shiraro, which Eritrean troops occupied on 12 May 1998 by deploying three brigades accompanied by tanks; all this to invade part of our country defended only by local militia and police. Thus the absurdity behind the present Eritrean demand that the area be demilitarized after having invaded part of our country which, for all intents and purposes, is already demilitarized.

This Council and the international community as a whole know perfectly well how Ethiopia has made all the necessary efforts to maintain friendship and close ties with Eritrea. No one in his right mind could contest the fact that Ethiopia gave full cooperation to the people of Eritrea in their efforts to exercise their self-determination, up to the internationally supervised referendum, and beyond.

The Eritrean aggression is totally inexplicable. There were, no doubt, and there are, border disputes between us. But we had agreed to resolve this peacefully and we had set up a Joint Commission for this purpose. In fact, the Joint Commission, the Eritrean party having been led by its Defence Minister, was meeting in Addis Ababa only a few days prior to the Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia. One of the issues discussed at this meeting was an incident which took place on 6 May inside Ethiopian territory whereby armed Eritreans had a scuffle with Ethiopian local police and militia whose only request was that the Eritreans leave their arms before proceeding to town or return across the border and deposit their weapons there and re-enter Ethiopian territory, as they should have done in the first instance. Even though the two countries had agreements on the free movement of their citizens, entering the sovereign territory of another country with arms was naturally bizarre.

At the Joint Commission meeting referred to earlier, there was an agreement between the two sides, among other things, that the Eritrean authorities would ensure the withdrawal of their armed contingents. But instead, and while Ethiopia was awaiting the implementation of the understanding reached, a

decision was made by the Eritrean authorities to launch the unprovoked and naked aggression against Ethiopia of 12 May.

Ethiopia did not respond immediately to this aggression launched against its territory, as it could have done, preferring instead to exercise patience in the hope that reason would prevail in Asmara and that the armed contingents would withdraw from Ethiopian territory peacefully, following which the dispute could be settled in a civilized manner, either through bilateral negotiation or through the involvement of a third party.

That was the essence of the position taken by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity in a statement endorsed by our Parliament, issued on 13 May 1998, which called on the Eritrean authorities to withdraw from Ethiopian territory unconditionally, failing which Ethiopia would exercise its right to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Ethiopia had made it clear that negotiations would not and could not commence on the outstanding dispute between us unless Eritrea withdraws its troops from Ethiopian territory and from the two localities that have never been part of Eritrea, either during the time of Italian colonialism or since. Ethiopia has absolutely no doubt that those localities claimed by Eritrea are Ethiopian. Ethiopia has nonetheless no problem with ascertaining its legitimate claim at any forum under whatever format. But Ethiopia cannot allow Eritrea to create facts on the ground through invasion and then call on Ethiopia to sit down for discussion. Nobody should be allowed to violate international law and then be rewarded for it. Ethiopia has a responsibility for standing its ground when international law is violated so flagrantly and so blatantly. I submit that all of us have a responsibility in this regard. This kind of behaviour cannot and should not be tolerated. All the more so, Mr. Chairman, by Africa, which has good reason for being seriously concerned about the kind of behaviour that continues to be demonstrated by Eritrea.

This aggression unleashed by Eritrea on Ethiopia's sovereignty and territorial integrity reflects Eritrea's absolute disregard for international law and for civilized behaviour. It forms a pattern of behaviour that Eritrea appears to have been used to and which it seems determined to continue, even in its relations with those with whom it maintained the closest of relations. There has been no closer friend to Eritrea than Ethiopia. When Eritrea does what it did to Ethiopia, then it becomes clear that for Eritrea not only international law but also friendship has no meaning. Trust has no meaning for Eritrea and mutual confidence has no place in Eritrea's relations with others.

It should not be overlooked, Mr. Chairman, that neither has Eritrea ever shown respect for the Organization of African Unity, but instead, true to the pattern of behaviour that has become the hallmark of the Eritrean leadership, it has been with absolute disdain that Eritrea has been treating the Organization of African Unity. This is something that is not usually talked about in public out of decency and in the belief that time and experience would temper Eritrea's arrogance and lack of civility. But Eritrea's arrogance and its disdain for Africa, its absolute disregard of international law and of all principles governing inter-State relations has now reached a stage where Eritrea has become

not only a source of shame for Africa and for its neighbours but also a menace to peace.

I wish to make a few points clearer to the august Council. Ethiopia has absolutely no desire to go to war with Eritrea. It has no claim over an inch of Eritrean territory. Moreover, if Eritrea has claims over Ethiopian territory, Ethiopia is willing to talk about these claims following Eritrea's unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Ethiopian territory. But I have no doubt that Africa would not, even for a moment, think it would be proper to reward aggression, which is what Eritrea wants. Unless Eritrea is stopped now and is told by Africa that enough is enough, there can be no end to what Eritrea will continue to do. If today it is Ethiopia, then who would be next? I pose this question with all seriousness and after close observation of Eritrea's pattern of behaviour over the past years, which has now come to haunt Ethiopia and our subregion.

Following the African tradition, Ethiopia has continued to show maximum restraint in the face of this Eritrean aggression. Even though our country was invaded and our territory was occupied, we refused to respond in kind. We agreed to use the good offices of friendly countries, including the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Rwanda and the United States of America. The latter two countries have continued to do the maximum possible to resolve the problem through their facilitation.

But even as these efforts have been under way, Eritrea has continued with provocative activities, with the intention of creating yet other facts on the ground by occupying yet other Ethiopian localities. This was done on 31 May 1998, through attacks on Ethiopian localities of Aiga and Aliteina, and on 3 June 1998 on Zala Ambasa, Aiga and Aliteina, all of which failed. But when Eritrean aggression is foiled, its prevarication takes its place with the intention of hoodwinking the international community. Eritrea says that Ethiopia has carried out aggression against Eritrea. This is pure and simple fabrication. In any case, when in history have aggressors admitted their deeds?

The truth is that Ethiopia has continued to cooperate with the facilitators because of its keen interest in giving peace a chance. Our hope is that Eritrea would do likewise.

But it is unlikely that Eritrea would allow the efforts of the facilitators to succeed, because Eritrea does not appear to see benefit in peace and stability. For reasons that are known only to the authorities in Eritrea, they seem to believe that somehow they would benefit by disturbing Ethiopia's peace, by throwing Ethiopia off balance and by making Ethiopia divert its attention away from development. They will not succeed; and Africa should not allow Eritrea to continue misbehaving and to continue posing a threat to peace and stability in our subregion and in Africa. The minimum that members of our Organization should tell the authorities in Eritrea, individually and, if necessary, collectively, is that it is not right and it is a danger for Africa for African States to invade others and create facts on the ground and then, after having created a fait accompli, to invite the invaded country for talks. This is dangerous, and if we happen to have two or three countries that behave

like Eritrea, then we might as well kiss African unity goodbye, and peace in our continent would be an illusion.

Our commitment to the prevention of conflict in our continent is being tested by Eritrea's pattern of behaviour. Our sense of African decency is being abused by a State which has no decency and by authorities who seem to feel glory comes only in war and that peace has no rewards. Africa should tell the Eritrean authorities that this is not the African view and that Africa has no time for conflicts, whether inter-State or intra-State. At the minimum, the Eritrean authorities should be asked by Africa, individually and collectively, to cooperate with those who have already made their good offices available to both countries. In this regard, let me make it unambiguously clear that Ethiopia has accepted the proposal submitted to both of us by the facilitators. Let Eritrea do likewise. This is the test of one's commitment to peace. The proposal is submitted by common friends, therefore there cannot be any alibi, and Eritrea cannot hide behind flimsy excuses. The Organization of African Unity and this Council should also discharge its responsibilities and ask Eritrea to cooperate with the facilitators by accepting their proposal.

All those involved with Ethiopia know that Ethiopia's cooperation has always been full and unambiguous. The bottom line for Ethiopia is that aggression cannot be rewarded. Ethiopia takes this position not only because this is dictated by Ethiopia's dignity, but also because it is dangerous to reward aggression. It is dangerous for Ethiopia and it is dangerous for Africa. Enough is enough is what the Eritreans should be told. Nothing less would suffice.



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Fifty-second session
Agenda items 64 and 81
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Identical letters dated 5 June 1998 from the representatives of
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
the Republic of Korea and Ukraine to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council

Our respective Governments have already expressed their grave concerns about the testing of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan, considering that those events could have most dangerous consequences for regional stability, international peace and security and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Our countries note the initial reaction on the part of the United Nations in reply to those developments. We maintain the strong view that its relevant organs should remain seized of the matter in order to examine comprehensively and further explore proactive responses to the situation created by the recent nuclear tests in South Asia and their implications for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, we believe that the convening of a formal meeting of this organ to consider all aspects of this situation at which Member States non-members of the Security Council could participate, would be an appropriate next step. Such a meeting could usefully accompany the adoption of any Security Council resolution on this issue.

Our countries would like to take this opportunity to reiterate their commitment contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.



We should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under items 64 and 81, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fernando PETRELLA
Permanent Representative of Argentina
to the United Nations

(Signed) Penelope WENSLEY
Permanent Representative of Australia
to the United Nations

(Signed) Robert FOWLER
Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations

(Signed) Juan LARRAÍN
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Chile
to the United Nations

(Signed) Yerzhan KAZYKHANOV
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Republic
of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

(Signed) Michael POWLES
Permanent Representative of
New Zealand to the United Nations

(Signed) See-Young LEE
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Korea to the United Nations

(Signed) V. YEL'CHENKO
Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations



Security Council

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5 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF
CHINA, FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to transmit herewith the joint communiqué adopted during the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at Geneva on 4 June 1998.

We would be grateful if you would have the text of the joint communiqué circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
China to the United Nations

(Signed) Alain DEJAMMET
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) Sergey V. LAVROV
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

(Signed) John WESTON
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) Bill RICHARDSON
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations



Annex

Joint communiqué adopted during the meeting of the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America at Geneva on 4 June 1998

1. Bearing in mind the responsibility of their countries for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America met at Geneva on 4 June 1998 to coordinate their response to the grave situation created by the nuclear tests carried out by India, and then by Pakistan, in May 1998. The Ministers condemned these tests, expressed their deep concern about the danger to peace and stability in the region and pledged to cooperate closely in urgent efforts to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race in the sub-continent to bolster the non-proliferation regime and to encourage reconciliation and peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.
2. The Ministers agreed that quick action is needed to arrest the further escalation of regional tensions stimulated by the recent nuclear tests. India and Pakistan should therefore stop all further such tests. They should refrain from the weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons, from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. They should also halt provocative statements, refrain from any military movements that could be construed as threatening and increase transparency in their actions. Direct communications between the parties could help to build confidence.
3. To reinforce security and stability in the region and more widely, the Five strongly believe that India and Pakistan should adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force. The Five also call upon India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other States in the Conference on Disarmament for a fissile material cut-off convention, with a view to reaching early agreement. The Five will seek firm commitments by India and Pakistan not to weaponize or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles. India and Pakistan should also confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and should undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.
4. The Ministers agreed that the international non-proliferation regime must remain strong and effective, despite the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. Their goal continues to be adherence by all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as it stands, without any modification. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding their recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapons States in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

5. The Ministers concluded that efforts to resolve disputes between India and Pakistan must be pursued with determination. The Ministers affirm their readiness to assist India and Pakistan, in a manner acceptable to both sides, in promoting reconciliation and cooperation. The Ministers pledged that they will actively encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions, through direct dialogue, that address the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, and to try to build confidence rather than seek confrontation. In that connection, the Ministers urged both parties to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations or other provocative acts.

6. The Ministers also considered what actions the Five could take, individually or collectively, to foster peace and security in South Asia. They will encourage India and Pakistan to adopt practical measures to prevent an arms race. They confirmed their respective policies to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons. They also undertook to do all they could to facilitate a reduction of tensions between those States and to provide assistance, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. They remain determined to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

7. The Ministers viewed their meeting at Geneva as setting in motion a process aimed at strengthening peace and stability in South Asia, at encouraging restraint by India and Pakistan, at promoting the resolution of outstanding differences and at bolstering the international non-proliferation regime. They will remain fully engaged in pursuing these goals and will work actively to build broad support in the international community for the objectives they agreed upon today.



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
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach a Press Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, on the further escalation of the war of aggression against Ethiopia by Eritrea.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulation as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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English
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Annex

Press Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ethiopia on 5 June 1998

In further escalation of the war of aggression against Ethiopia and at a time when Ethiopia has accepted fully the proposal submitted by the facilitators on the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instead of showing readiness for peace, the authorities in Eritrea have today (5 June 1998) carried out an air attack on Mekelle, wounding five persons. While this is, as already indicated, a further escalation of the war of aggression, it should come as no surprise because by now it should be clear that the irrationality in Asmara has no limits.

Accordingly, and in response to this Eritrean aggression Ethiopia has in self-defence taken limited measures against Asmara Air Force Base. Further details concerning this matter will be made public as and when they are available.



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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF LUXEMBOURG TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the text of a statement on
Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
following the ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg on 28 and 29 May 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and of its
annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Louis WOLZFELD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Luxembourg to the United Nations



Annex

[Original: French]

Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina issued at the close
of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) held at Luxembourg on 28 May 1998

1. The Alliance has made a decisive contribution to stability and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently, encouraging progress has been achieved in implementing several elements of the 1995 Peace Agreement. However, much remains to be done. Today, after consultation with the non-NATO contributor countries, we approved the operational plans for maintaining the Stabilization Force (SFOR) beyond June 1998 in order to promote the further implementation of the Peace Agreement. With the establishment within SFOR of a specialized multinational unit having the same mandate as its other elements, SFOR will be better equipped to help the local authorities deal with civil unrest without acting as a police force, thereby facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons and the taking of office by elected officials.

2. While responsibility for implementation of the Agreement lies first and foremost with the parties, SFOR will continue, within the limits of its resources and abilities, to provide broad support for the implementation of civilian components. Accordingly, it will provide assistance to the following, while maintaining close and effective coordination with them:

The High Representative, for the implementation of civilian elements of the Peace Agreement;

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, on a priority basis, in connection with the staggered and orderly return of refugees;

The United Nations International Police Task Force, for the reform and restructuring of the local police;

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in the context of the September elections;

The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, by transferring to The Hague persons accused of war crimes.

Arrests by SFOR during the past year of persons accused of war crimes have contributed to the peace process and have highlighted our willingness not to overlook this aspect of the Peace Agreement.

3. The achievement of progress in these areas will contribute not only to the consolidation of peace within a single democratic and multi-ethnic State but also to the creation of conditions in which a military presence headed by NATO will no longer be necessary. NATO has adopted a series of criteria for measuring the progress achieved in the overall implementation of the Peace

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Agreement. This will make it possible gradually to reduce the number of Force members and reduce its profile in terms of its agreed tasks.

4. We are strongly in favour of continuing implementation of arms-control and confidence-building measures at the local and regional levels. We look forward to the opening of negotiations on arms control, as provided for in the Peace Agreement, in order to restore a regional balance in the former Yugoslavia and the surrounding countries, particularly with appropriate provisions for verification. The Alliance has begun a series of cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina in the field of security with a view to promoting trust and cooperation in the country's armed forces and encouraging the development of democratic practices and centralized defence mechanisms, such as the Standing Committee for Military Affairs created by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. We call upon all the parties to the Peace Agreement to redouble their efforts for the full implementation of the Agreement, thereby creating the conditions for a peaceful, stable and prosperous future for Bosnia and Herzegovina.



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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND
SPANISH

Costa Rica, Japan, Slovenia and Sweden: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the statements of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12) and of 29 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/17),

Reiterating the statement of its President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), which stated, inter alia, that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and stability in the region,

Deeply concerned at the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and determined to prevent such a race,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the successful outcome of that Conference,

Affirming the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and welcoming the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty,

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;

2. Endorses the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998 (S/1998/473);

3. Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

4. Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;

5. Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;

6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;

7. Calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;

8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect;

9. Expresses its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;

10. Reaffirms its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;

11. Expresses its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and recalls that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;

12. Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;

13. Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;

14. Urges India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;

16. Expresses its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
